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A CONTINUUM IN REMEDIES: RECONNECTING VACANT 
HOUSES TO THE MARKET 
JAMES J. KELLY, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, America’s older, undercrowded cities have struggled with 
neighborhoods beset by vacant houses that seemingly have no connection with 
a functioning real estate market. Working-class communities once teeming 
with homeowners are now pockmarked by derelict houses and overgrown lots 
that attract crime and deter investment. Even as inner-city crime rates continue 
their downward trend and environmentally conscious resistance to 
metropolitan sprawl mounts, the residential areas closest to America’s 
downtowns appear to be losing the battle against the virulent vacant property 
contagion. 
A nationwide foreclosure crisis has brought attention to the need for inner-
city and other metropolitan communities to address vacant house nuisances. In 
1995, Cleveland already had tens of thousands of vacant properties.1 In the ten 
years that followed, foreclosures in Cleveland doubled, and then doubled again 
between 2005 and 2007.2 Recognizing the far-reaching effects of the 
foreclosure crisis, Congress created the Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
(NSP), which has provided approximately $7 billion in assistance to states and 
cities hardest hit by the fallout from the foreclosure epidemic.3 The National 
Vacant Properties Campaign, itself founded in 2004, merged in 2010 with the 
 
* Clinical Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. 
 1. Timothy Williams, Blighted Cities Prefer Razing to Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/us/blighted-cities-prefer-razing-to-rebuilding.html. 
 2. CLAUDIA COULTON & KATHY HEXTER, FED. RESERVE BANK, FACING THE 
FORECLOSURE CRISIS IN GREATER CLEVELAND: WHAT HAPPENED AND HOW COMMUNITIES 
ARE RESPONDING 4 (2010). 
 3. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 
(2008) (created NSP with $3.92 billion); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (commonly referred to as Dodd-Frank, which 
appropriated $2 billion to NSP 2 and $1 billion to NSP 3, respectively). NSP 3 Funds can be used 
only for five eligible uses: 1) Use financing mechanisms for purchase and redevelopment; 2) 
Purchase and rehabilitate for sale, rental, or redevelopment; 3) Establish and operate land banks; 
4) Demolish blighted structures; and 5) Redevelop vacant properties for housing. Housing 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 § 257. 
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Genesee Institute, of Flint, Michigan, to form the Center for Community 
Progress, a nationwide advocacy and technical assistance provider for 
communities struggling with vacant property problems.4 
It would seem, at first glance, that insufficient demand for these types of 
homes in these neighborhoods fully accounts for the spread of house vacancy. 
Any attempts to fight the market and turn back the clock would then be 
hopelessly unsustainable. But, such resignation is unwarranted. 
Because the elimination of vacant house nuisances, whether by 
rehabilitation or demolition, involves significant financial investment,5 it is 
crucial that public officials pay attention to the market dynamics of the 
neighborhood. But they must not take an owner’s allowing property to lapse 
into and remain in a derelict state as an indication that the market has rendered 
a final (and correct) judgment. Even those who hold up the market as an 
efficient allocator of resources that should not be hampered recognize that their 
trust in it is based on certain assumptions necessary to its functioning 
properly.6 Markets work if actors can recognize and take advantage of 
opportunities to invest.7 While government regulation can create barriers to 
efficient transactions, low-capacity owners, information costs, and property 
fragmentation can also get in the way of worthwhile investment.8 Legal tools 
can work to reduce these impediments to market functioning.9 
This paper argues that recent developments in property theory help us 
understand and complete reforms of legal remedies that target certain types of 
market dysfunction. By appropriately reducing barriers to sensible investment, 
in rem code enforcement through tailored tax foreclosure proceedings can 
reverse decline in struggling neighborhoods. Traditional responses to the 
problem of blight reflect a binary choice between strong deference to property-
owner autonomy and complete liquidation of property interests.10 In personam 
code enforcement remedies emanate from a legal understanding of real estate 
 
 4. Dan Kildee, Foreword to FRANK S. ALEXANDER, LAND BANKS AND LAND BANKING, at 
8 (2011). 
 5. CITY OF SOUTH BEND, VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TASK FORCE REPORT 5 
(2013), available at http://southbendin.gov/sites/default/file/files/Code_FinalVATF_Report_2_ 
red.pdf. 
 6. See generally Christine Jolls et. al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
 7. Id. at 1483. 
 8. See generally Jolls et. al, supra note 6. 
 9. See OFFICE OF POL’Y DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
REVITALIZING FORECLOSED PROPERTIES WITH LANDBANKS 13 (2009). 
 10. James J. Kelly, Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool 
for Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & 
CMTY. DEV. L. 210, 211 (2004). 
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ownership as the strongest of property-rule-protected entitlements.11 Local 
government authorities hold owners directly accountable for any failures to 
address specific property problems through imposition of fines and threats of 
contempt.12 Eminent domain, on the other hand, is invoked to facilitate 
massive redevelopment. When individualized policing of code norms breaks 
down, government’s only other apparent option is to declare failure and start 
from scratch.13 
Traditional code enforcement works fairly well against owners that are 
amenable to such pressures and that hold properties in functioning 
neighborhood real estate markets.14 But, in areas that have many abandoned 
properties, owners are unable to obtain the resources to complete repairs; and, 
even in healthier neighborhoods, owners may strategically evade conventional 
enforcement or be genuinely incapable of fixing up the property or transferring 
it to someone who can.15 Eminent domain, on the other hand, can be 
unnecessarily drastic and is usually driven by a massive new building project, 
which may be unrealistic for a city that is, on the whole, shrinking. 
Inner-city neighborhoods in strong regional markets, as well as those in 
regions experiencing continuing out-migration, must fill the gap between 
traditional code enforcement’s total deference to the owner’s right to exclude, 
on the one hand, and eminent domain’s willy-nilly liquidation of all property 
rights. A neighborhood market that is strong enough to support full-scale 
rehabilitation of any structurally sound vacant house may weaken irreversibly 
if subjected to even spot use of eminent domain authority. Yet, as will be 
shown below, traditional code enforcement remedies may not be able to bring 
about even those renovations supported by market logic. Sometimes, the owner 
is unwilling or unable to carry out a rehabilitation that will be good not only 
for the neighborhood but for the owner as well. More commonly, the owner 
would benefit from the additional investment, if only the owner had any equity 
 
 11. Id. “A property rule entitlement protection approach assumes that an entitlement will 
only be transferred, modified, or terminated through a transaction in which the price, if any, is 
determined by consensual agreement of the parties, i.e., by market forces, however efficient or 
inefficient, fair or unfair, those forces may be.” John A. Lovett, Meditations on Strathclyde: 
Controlling Private Land Use Restrictions at the Crossroads of Legal Systems, 36 SYRACUSE J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 1, 34 (2008). 
 12. Kelly, supra note 10, at 215. 
 13. See id. at 215–16 (“Traditional code enforcement cannot force all vacant property 
owners to the realization that if they want to continue to own their houses then they must bring 
them into compliance with the code. Even if fines and other coercive mechanisms succeed in 
bringing about the rehabilitation of a great number of properties, those vacant houses that are 
beyond the code enforcement’s reach persist as a threat to an urban neighborhood in transition . . . 
The economic security of urban-healthy neighborhoods and cities requires an additional approach 
to vacant building code enforcement.”). 
 14. Id. at 215. 
 15. Id. at 214. 
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in the property to begin with. Foreclosure of some kind may be the only way to 
reconnect this property to the market. Particularly when lenders are more 
hesitant to take ownership of derelict properties, a government tool for 
bringing about a change in ownership based upon lack of code compliance is 
needed. 
For weaker neighborhood markets, rehabilitation on a one-by-one basis 
may be impossible without an unrealistic amount of public subsidy. Just as 
dysfunction in the ownership of a single parcel may require an alternative 
approach to code enforcement, fragmented land ownership in a very weak 
market may require the coordination of investment through land assembly. 
Some neighborhood markets may support further investment if all the vacant 
properties in them can be rehabilitated concurrently. While single-property 
liquidation, or title assembly, is best carried out by code enforcement related 
foreclosure, property tax foreclosure provides the more effective means for 
land assembly.16 
Part I provides an overview of the barriers that inner-city neighborhoods 
must surmount in order to abate vacant house nuisances and regain community 
vibrancy. Part II shows that any comprehensive vacant house abatement 
strategy needs to contend with the transaction costs caused by owner inaction 
and property fragmentation by filling in the remedy gap between in personam 
code enforcement and eminent domain. Part III reviews existing innovations 
and lays out the essential features of the remedies needed. 
I.  BARRIERS TO VACANT HOUSE NUISANCE ABATEMENT 
A. How Vacant Houses Impact Neighborhoods 
All, or almost all, vacant houses start off as recently occupied houses. Both 
in common usage and official terminology, the difference between “vacant” 
and “unoccupied” is generally a matter of time, with “vacant” often being 
defined as unoccupied for more than 90 days.17 Lack of occupancy, even for an 
extended period, does not by itself constitute a nuisance.18 But, long-term 
 
 16. See U.S. DEPT. HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REVITALIZING FORECLOSED PROPERTIES WITH 
LAND BANKS 2–3 (2009), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/land 
banks.pdf. 
 17. U.S. POSTAL SERV., PUBLICATION 32: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 230 (July 2013), available 
at http://about.usps.com/publications/pub32.pdf (stating 90 days unoccupied and not receiving 
mail is considered an unoccupied delivery point). Addresses that are demolished or so blighted as 
to be judged not likely receive mail in the near future are considered a no-stat delivery point. Id. 
at 148. 
 18. See CMTY. LEGAL RES., VACANT PROPERTY LEGAL MANUAL 17 (2009) (discussing the 
importance of maintaining vacant properties, then discussing the importance of preventing the 
home from becoming a nuisance to the community). For a discussion of a legal definition of 
structures that are per se unsafe, see infra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
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vacancy predictably leads to neglect and decay. Water, sun, and wind 
constantly batter roofs, windows, siding, and gutters. Lack of occupancy and 
the attendant lack of income inevitably occasion lack of vigilance and lack of 
maintenance. Exposure to the elements degrades the exterior of the house first 
and makes its neglect apparent to even the casual observer. 
Signs of vacancy also invite intentional abuse.19 Vandals can, in a few 
minutes, casually inflict damage that would take nature years to bring about. 
Thieves may not find much in the way of valuable personal property left 
behind, but they can, and do, take the copper piping and wiring right out of the 
walls for resale as scrap.20 Their ham-fisted demolition can endanger neighbors 
by creating gas leaks and floods.21 In 2010, fifteen families on Cleveland’s 
west side were left homeless by a gas explosion in a vacant house ransacked by 
a thief stealing copper and appliances.22 
Once man or nature has broken them open, unsecured properties either 
remain open to casual entry or are boarded up. Both futures are problematic for 
the immediate community. An unsecured property solicits trespass.23 A study 
of unsecured vacant properties found 83% of them showed signs of 
unauthorized occupancy or criminal activity.24 Squatters may start fires in the 
property for cooking or heat.25 These and other activities lead to various 
emergencies that often require police, fire, and emergency medical personnel 
to enter poorly lit, dangerous spaces.26 
If a rundown vacant building signals neighborhood decline, a boarded-up 
property blares that message out through a megaphone. James Wilson and 
 
 19. CMTY. LEGAL RES., supra note 18, at 1. 
 20. Amanda Pinto, ‘Scrapper’ Faces 57 Charges in West Haven Copper Thefts, NEW 
HAVEN REG. (June 2, 2011), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20110601/scrapper-faces-
57-charges-in-west-haven-copper-thefts. 
 21. Id.; Nok-Noi Ricker, Brewer City Council Finds Dilapidated House a Danger, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (Oct. 8, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/10/08/news/bangor/brewer-city-
council-finds-dilapidated-house-adanger/; Mark Puente, Explosion Destroys 4 Homes, Damages 
Dozens in Cleveland Blast has Eerie Similarities to One on West Side in January, CLEVELAND 
PLAIN DEALER, May 13, 2010, at A1. 
 22. Pat Galbincea and Gabriel Baird, Blast at Vacant West Side House Leaves at Least 15 
Families Homeless, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 26, 2010, at B3; Stan Donaldson, Man 
Sentenced for Thefts from Home that Later Exploded, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 3, 2010, 
at B3. 
 23. Kelly, supra note 10, at 212–13. 
 24. William Spelman, Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for Crime, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 481, 
481–95 (1993). 
 25. Jim Cook, Jr., Squatter With Cooking Equipment May Have Caused Millville Fire, S. 
JERSEY TIMES (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.nj.com/cumberland/index.ssf/2011/11/squatter_with_ 
cooking_equipmen.html. 
 26. 3 Firefighters Hurt in Blaze Damaging 3 Vacant Homes, INDY STAR (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.indystar.com/article/20120827/NEWS/120827001. 
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George Kelling’s classic article about the impact of small, seemingly 
superficial signs of disorder was entitled Broken Windows.27 It demonstrated 
how subtle signals of decline can accelerate it.28 There is nothing subtle, 
however, about a house that has all its windows covered by 3´ by 5´ pieces of 
plywood. It broadcasts the news that the neighborhood is in bad shape now and 
is not expected to improve anytime soon. Prospective residents who have 
choices about where they might live are unlikely to choose a block with a 
boarded-up house on it.29 Nevertheless, some communities have recognized 
that boarded properties, which are uninhabitable, and very visibly so, are 
preferable to houses that are open to casual entry.30 The City of Augusta, 
Georgia has passed an ordinance establishing a permit process for 
“mothballing” vacant houses.31 
Whether boarded or open to casual entry, visibly uninhabitable vacant 
properties have devastating effects on the surrounding community. Vacant 
houses inflict tremendous costs on residents of adjacent properties, 
neighborhoods, and city governments.32 They attract crime, harbor vermin, and 
pose a danger for community children.33 They can destroy nearby houses 
through fire and water damage.34 Adjacent property owners have found it 
costly, and sometimes impossible, to get casualty and liability insurance 
because of a vacant house next door. 35 It is little wonder that the presence of 
vacant houses reduces the resale value of compliant houses within a block or 
two by at least 1.3% per vacant house.36 
 
 27. See generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Kelly, supra note 10, at 212. 
 30. See Johnny Edwards, Mothball Ordinance Creates Complaints, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Jan. 
28, 2008), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2008-01-28/mothball-ordinance-creates-com 
plaints; Susan McCord, “Mothball’ permits aren’t solutions for all blighted sites in Augusta, 
AUGUSTA CHRON. (JULY 12, 2011), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/government/2011-07-12/ 
mothball-permits-aren-t-solutions-all-blighted-sites-augusta. 
 31. Edwards, supra note 30. 
 32. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
 33. Brian Nordli, Boy Killed in Fire was Playing with Brother Inside Vacant Home, LAS 
VEGAS SUN (May 2, 2013), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/may/02/house-fire-claims-
life-las-vegas-child/. 
 34. See Ricker, supra note 21; Puente, supra note 21. 
 35. NAT’L VACANT PROPS. CAMPAIGN, VACANT PROPERTIES: THE TRUE COST TO 
COMMUNITIES 11 (2005). 
 36. STEPHEN WHITAKER & THOMAS J. FITZPATRICK, IV, THE IMPACT OF VACANT, TAX-
DELINQUENT AND FORECLOSED PROPERTY ON SALES PRICES OF NEIGHBORING HOME 2 (2012) 
(“We find that an additional property within 500 feet that is vacant, delinquent, or both reduces 
the home’s selling price by at least 1.3 percent.”). 
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B. How Local Governments Respond to Vacant House Problems 
With so much at stake, state and local governments in many states have 
made addressing vacant properties a top policy priority. They have moved 
beyond traditional public nuisance remedies and enacted a range of policy 
solutions targeted at mitigating or eliminating vacant house problems. 
Realizing the need for more and better data about the vacant houses in their 
communities, cities such as Wilmington and Cincinnati have enacted vacant 
property registration ordinances.37 Often these ordinances provide for the 
collection not only of information but of money as well.38 By taxing owner 
inaction, these ordinances point toward the primary response to vacant houses: 
code enforcement.39 
Section 115 of the International Building Code (IBC) provides for the 
definition of and official response to unsafe structures.40 The law provides the 
local building official with the authority to identify structures as unsafe and 
ensure that they are “taken down and removed or made safe.”41 Unsafe 
buildings include those that are “insanitary, deficient in light and ventilation or 
adequate exit facilities, constitute a fire hazard or are otherwise dangerous to 
human life.”42 Apart from declaring any vacant structure that is “not secured 
against entry” to be unsafe,43 the IBC does not explicitly address vacant 
buildings as unsafe structures. It does not delineate what kinds of structural 
deficiencies are unsafe when a building has no one living, or even going, inside 
it regularly. 
State and local law authorizing enforcement action against vacant property 
nuisances have filled this gap. In addition to adopting the IBC statewide, 
Indiana has also enacted an unsafe building law that it allows local 
jurisdictions to adopt by ordinance.44 That statute’s definition of an unsafe 
building tracks, more or less, the IBC definition, but includes a structure that is 
 
 37. Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community Stabilization: The Forgotten First 
Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed Homes, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 101, 136–42 (2009). See 
also Yun Sang Lee et al., New Data on Local Vacant Property Registration Ordinances, 15 
CITYSCAPE: J. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES. 289, 260 (2013). 
 38. “Registration fees can range from $70 per year (Chula Vista, California), to $420 per 
quarter (San Jose, California), to up to $5,000 per year (Wilmington, Delaware).” Schilling, supra 
note 37, at 132. 
 39. Id. at 134. 
 40. The International Building Code has been adopted, either jurisdiction-wide or by local 
governments, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. INT’L CODE COUNCIL, 
INTERNATIONAL CODES-ADOPTION BY STATE (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.iccsafe.org/ 
gr/Documents/stateadoptions.pdf. 
 41. INT’L BLDG. CODE § 116.1 (2012). 
 42. INT’L BLDG. CODE § 116.1. 
 43. INT’L BLDG. CODE § 116.1. 
 44. IND. CODE § 36-7-9-1 (1982). 
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“vacant and not maintained in a manner that would allow human habitation, 
occupancy, or use under the requirements of a statute or an ordinance”45 This 
extension of the concept of an unsafe building subjects any vacant property not 
fit to be lived in to an order to repair immediately or even demolish the 
structure.46 The statute, however, requires that any ordered action “be 
reasonably related to the condition of the unsafe premises and the nature and 
use of nearby properties.”47 Thus, an order to repair must focus on those 
deficiencies that either make a property a danger or make it unfit for 
occupancy and cannot extend to preventative maintenance.48 Likewise, a 
demolition order must be justified by the building’s severely deteriorated 
condition and its lack of prospects for prompt renovation.49 
The IBC authorizes enforcement generally, but does not specify the 
methods or penalties.50 Enforcement mechanisms and standards are left for 
state and local adopters to provide, usually through modification of the IBC or 
enactment of separate legislation.51 Traditional code enforcement involves the 
issuance of a notice of violation, the imposition of fines for failure to comply 
and, ultimately, resort to judicial orders to correct the violation.52 A court may 
enforce its order through contempt proceedings as long as compliance is 
possible.53 As discussed below, repairs that cost more than the resulting value 
of the property may be impossible to finance through a private mortgage.54 In 
the absence of such a loan, an owner of a vacant property may be able to avoid 
any proceedings for civil or criminal contempt.55 Thus, the coercive approach 
code enforcement may fall apart in the face of a neighborhood market too 
weak to support rehabilitation investment. 
 
 45. IND. CODE § 36-7-9-4(a)(6) (2005). 
 46. IND. CODE § 36-7-9-5(a) (2013). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Foursquare Tabernacle Church of God in Christ v. Dep’t of Metro. Dev. Of Consol. City 
of Indianapolis, 630 N.E.2d 1381, 1389–90 (Ind. App. 1994) (City could order repair of items in 
danger of falling but could not require that chimney be functional). 
 49. Kopinski v. Health and Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty., 766 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ind. App. 
2002) (house that required 30% reconstruction two months after fire could not be ordered 
demolished when funds for reconstruction were imminent). 
 50. INT’L BLDG. CODE §§ 113.3, 113.4 (2012). 
 51. International Code Adoptions, INT’L CODE COUNCIL (2014), http://www.iccsafe.org/gr/ 
Pages/adoptions.aspx. See also Building Codes, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, (Jan. 25, 
2013), http://www.fema.gov/earthquake/building-codes. 
 52. Kelly, supra note 10, at 214. 
 53. Shippen v. Shippen, 693 S.E.2d 240, 244 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). 
 54. See infra Part I.C. 
 55. Id.  
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C. How Neighborhoods Impact Responses to Vacant House Problems 
At $50 per square foot, a conservative, “gut” rehabilitation of a 1,500-
square foot vacant house would cost $75,000. Even houses that can be made 
ready for occupancy for substantially less nearly always require more than the 
$10,000 that the average demolition and removal would cost.56 Since 
elimination of a vacant house nuisance always involves a major capital 
investment,57 no sensible response strategy can ignore the importance of the 
return on that investment. Even if an owner is willing to make repair 
expenditures that cannot be recaptured through increased use, income, or resale 
value, no lender may be willing to provide the necessary funds.58 With so 
much money involved, the financial advisability of rehabilitation often dictates 
whether or not it goes forward. 
No factor will limit the return on rehabilitation investment more than the 
weakness of the neighborhood real estate market. If the best homes on a block 
are not selling for more than $50,000, investing $75,000 in a full-scale 
rehabilitation of a vacant property on that block is not financially prudent. For 
many older, inner-city neighborhoods, houses without major defects can be 
purchased for less than $25,000.59 But, once these properties have fallen into 
disrepair, the market will not support their renovation.60 Traditional code 
enforcement does not render such considerations irrelevant. In a marginal case, 
the inducement of fines and, possibly, imprisonment may well motivate an 
owner to rehabilitate a property that would otherwise languish.61 But, in 
situations where the verdict of the market is unequivocal, renovation is 
unlikely, even with governmental coercion.62 
Under such an analysis, it’s not at all surprising that vacant property 
problems are so pervasive and intractable. Vacant properties are more a 
symptom of, than a major contributing factor to, the decline of older, inner-city 
neighborhoods throughout the United States. The tremendous gap between 
land values in inner-city and suburban neighborhoods also has little to do with 
location per se, but a great deal to do with the quality of local public goods 
such as schools, public safety, and shopping and recreational amenities.63 
Many inner-city neighborhoods have high concentrations of poverty, a reality 
 
 56. Leila Atassi, Cleveland’s Glut of Vacant Housing Could Cost Billions to Eliminate at 
Current Pace, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/in 
dex.ssf/2012/09/clevelands_glut_of_vacant_hous.html. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. ROBERT L. KEMP, THE INNER CITY: A HANDBOOK FOR RENEWAL 310 (2001). 
 60. Kelly, supra note 10, at 214. 
 61. Id. at 215. 
 62. Id. 
 63. WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 45–46 (2001). 
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that strongly shapes education, crime and commerce in those places.64 
Suburban development was first made possible by legislative moves to prevent 
cities from annexing development on their fringes.65 The use of racially 
restrictive covenants by early suburban developers ensured that whites would 
make up the overwhelming majority of the new residents.66 The use of 
exclusionary zoning set up barriers to socioeconomic integration that survived 
decades after the judicial rejection of explicit racial discrimination.67 Even as 
the courts moved to integrate schools, suburban districts were exempted from 
busing remedies unless civil rights plaintiffs could show a history of deliberate 
racial discrimination in those relatively new areas.68 Suburban land was 
unburdened not only by industrial waste and aging infrastructure, but also by 
the taint of a racist past. The message throughout the second-half of the 
twentieth century was clear: A family with the economic ability to choose its 
neighborhood should move to the land of the fresh start, the suburbs.69 
In the inner city, the loss of those low-skill, high-wage manufacturing jobs 
that first induced the Great Migration set the stage for widespread 
unemployment, civil unrest, and epidemics of violent crime, drug abuse, and 
chronic disease.70 Baltimore’s 1950 population of almost 950,000 shrank to a 
2010 low just beneath 621,000, a decline of 35%.71 Even as the metropolitan 
area as a whole grew, Baltimore’s population dropped by double-digit 
percentages in both the 1970s and 1990s.72 A city built for a million residents 
now has more than 30,000 vacant houses and vacant lots.73 As with many 
 
 64. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, 
BARRIOS AND THE AMERICAN CITY (1997). 
 65. Christopher J. Tyson, Localism and Involuntary Annexation: Reconsidering Approaches 
to New Regionalism, 87 TUL. L. REV. 297, 303–23 (2012). 
 66. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 64, at 51–55. 
 67. FISCHEL, supra note 63, at 65–71. 
 68. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 782 (1974). 
 69. Id. at 801. 
 70. WILSON, supra note 64, at 20–92; BERNADETTE HANLON, JOHN RENNIE SHORT & 
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under-crowded urban communities, neither the population loss nor the housing 
vacancies are equally distributed throughout the city.74 
The much smaller city of South Bend, Indiana also experienced about a 
30% loss in population from 1970—six years after its primary industrial 
employer, Studebaker, closed for good—to 2010.75 A handful of 
neighborhoods on the west side of town lost more than half their populations 
during those four decades. 76 Not surprisingly, the majority of the more than 
1,000 vacant and abandoned properties in South Bend are located in these 
largely African-American and poor neighborhoods.77 But, other South Bend 
neighborhoods also have derelict, vacant houses.78 While these neighborhoods 
are affected by the litany of urban problems that tamp down demand for 
housing in the inner city, their higher housing values keep vacant house 
renovation an economic possibility. The presence of protracted vacant house 
nuisances in these communities requires further inquiry into the reasons why 
properties remain abandoned. 
In addition to the formidable array of social problems that diminishes 
demand for residences in the central city, inner-city real estate markets face 
other challenges as well. These problems do not depress demand so much as 
distort the market in which housing is priced. Small lot sizes mean that city 
dwellers are more sensitive to the uses, and abuses, that occur on neighboring 
properties.79 This proximity can foster greater social capital and take advantage 
of positive externalities associated with a vibrant city life.80 But, negative 
externalities, like those associated with a derelict, vacant structure, are also 
amplified.81 Small lot sizes are a primary reason why the presence of a vacant 
house has such powerful effects on the prices of neighboring properties.82 
Vacant houses are a cause, as well as a symptom of, weak inner-city market 
neighborhoods because these communities are so dense.83 Interdependence 
requires effective measures of accountability.84 
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Fragmentation of city land into small lots requires a buyer to be as 
concerned about his or her neighbors’ investments in their properties almost as 
much as his or her care for his or her own property.85 But, fragmentation 
within the ownership of a property can frustrate appropriate investment as 
well. Like suburban owners, inner-city homeowners have mortgages on their 
homes. But, the unsustainable spread of subprime lending, especially in 
communities of color, led to a wave of foreclosures that has produced many 
more vacant houses.86 The confusing array of lender assignments and loan 
servicer changes that frustrated borrowers seeking loan modifications also 
made it very difficult to identify and contact those responsible for recently 
foreclosed properties.87 When the vacant houses became burdens rather than 
assets for lenders, foreclosures were aborted, leaving even more confusion as 
to who had the authority and responsibility for maintaining them.88 When legal 
ownership of a property is in limbo, even cost-effective investments and 
maintenance will fall between the cracks.89 To foster sustainability in the urban 
core, vacant house nuisance remedies should focus on making sure markets 
work effectively by internalizing costs of vacant houses to those responsible 
and coordinating investment in the face of property fragmentation. 
II.  THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF REMEDIES 
The conventional governmental response to urban decline has focused on 
cost internalization and investment coordination, albeit separately. Traditional 
code enforcement has sought to make derelict property owners feel the pain 
they inflict on the members of the community.90 When the economics of 
decline has overwhelmed such case-by-case policing, redevelopment officials 
have, sometimes and after much delay, invoked the nuclear option of eminent 
domain, the ultimate in investment coordination.91 These two poles of the 
vacant property nuisance abatement spectrum correspond to the basic division 
of legal remedies generally. In personam remedies use sanctions to affect 
internalization of costs, in the vacant property context, to have a landowner 
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bear all the external costs associated with his or her ownership of the land.92 In 
rem responses, on the other hand, focus on the ownership of the property rather 
than the actions of the landowner.93 Eminent domain coordinates investment 
by bringing fragmented property into unified ownership, assembling both title 
interests within parcels and parcels within the contiguous redevelopment 
area.94 Code enforcement preserves the autonomy of the owner but forces him 
or her to bear the responsibility of it.95 Eminent domain liquidates ownership 
of the property and gives the owner its fair market value in cash.96 
A classic work of legal scholarship categorized property entitlements by 
the types of remedies that law and equity offered to protect them.97 In Property 
Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, Guido 
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed noted that some entitlements enjoy 
protection by injunction while the holders of other entitlements can expect only 
money damages as compensation.98 Owners in the former category, which the 
authors call property rule entitlements, can name their price on any sale of their 
entitlements because, backed by the power of court order, they cannot be made 
to transfer their entitlements on any other terms.99 Liability rule entitlements, 
however, can be liquidated at some adjudicated price, usually their fair market 
value.100 Use of liability rules eliminate holdout problems and reduce other 
transaction costs.101 Property rule approaches persist in land ownership due to 
the high degree of personal investment put into it and the need for stability.102 
Traditional code enforcement pressures owners through fines without 
interfering directly with their autonomy.103 As such, it represents a property 
rule approach.104 But, the use of eminent domain in urban redevelopment 
demonstrates that even land ownership can be rendered a liability rule 
entitlement.105 It protects the cash value of the owner’s interest even as it 
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liquidates it to achieve land assembly goals.106 As shown above, traditional 
code enforcement can succeed in neighborhoods with high land values but is 
less effective when the owner’s net gains from rehabilitation diminish.107 
Eminent domain is a sledgehammer that gains control of nuisance properties 
but only after destroying, rather than supporting, the confidence of neighboring 
property owners.108 The space between these two extremes provides 
opportunities for innovation. 
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have demonstrated that certain 
legal rules move between both types of remedial protection.109 Dubbing these 
pliant remedial structures, which the authors call “pliability rules”, Bell and 
Parchomovsky show how the law can calibrate protection of in-kind 
entitlements to produce efficient results.110 Foreclosure represents the 
prominent pliability rule structure associated with land ownership.111 When an 
owner’s title has been conditioned on repayment of a debt, foreclosure 
proceedings determine at what point his or her equity of redemption, his or her 
right to pay off the debt and preserve the in-kind nature of the land ownership, 
will be terminated and the property transferred to or on behalf of the 
creditor.112 Most foreclosure sales are liability rule approaches in that they do 
not cause the owner to forfeit the monetary value of remaining equity but 
preserve it by requiring any surplus net sale proceeds to be paid out to those 
who were foreclosed upon.113 Foreclosure proceedings start with the 
borrower’s interest in the collateral as a property rule entitlement moving 
towards a liability rule entitlement.114 The focus of the procedure is to 
determine when the owner’s time to redeem has finally elapsed.115 
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To use pliability rules in the context of vacant house remediation, we need 
to develop in rem foreclosure remedies that make noncompliance with public 
norms a basis for liquidating the existing title interests. To be effective not 
only against the owner but all stakeholders in the property, the threat of 
foreclosure must be based on a lien that takes priority over all existing private 
interests, a so-called super-priority lien.116 Vacant building receivership sales 
and property tax foreclosure proceedings use such liens.117 Deploying a 
foreclosure mechanism based upon an owner’s failure to pursue a feasible 
rehabilitation moves code enforcement strategy from a sanction against willful 
failure to comply to a price-based approach that reveals the property’s potential 
value and the costs of realizing it.118 By putting delinquent owners in 
competition with other potential rehabilitators, this code-based foreclosure 
method makes sure those properties that can be fixed up are.119 
When even the most effective cost internalization is insufficient to achieve 
rehabilitation, there is no need to turn immediately to the extreme of eminent 
domain. Investment coordination can also be achieved through a pliability 
rule’s conditional deference to the owner’s property rights.120 Rather than take 
all properties in a severely distressed neighborhood, a coordinated use of 
property tax foreclosure can assemble those properties that owners have 
walked away from, as evidence by their failure to pay delinquent property 
taxes.121 Under this calibrated approach to investment coordination, owners 
fully committed to their properties will not suffer the demoralization costs 
associated with invocation of eminent domain.122 
An in rem approach to code enforcement can force cost internalization in 
new and effective ways. A land assembly method that allows private property 
owners a chance to redeem coordinates investment without demoralizing 
existing property owners.123 Before turning to particularized descriptions of 
how vacant building receivership sales and vacant property tax foreclosures are 
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best structured, I will walk through how these two foreclosure pliability 
structures fill the gap between traditional code enforcement and eminent 
domain. 
As discussed above, urban real estate markets face a significant challenge 
in small lot sizes.124 Urban property owners must be almost as concerned with 
their neighbor’s investment and upkeep choices as they are with their own.125 
The lapse of an unoccupied house into a derelict condition imposes an external 
cost upon the neighbors.126 By sanctioning serious and visible code violations, 
local governments try to make responsible owners feel their neighbors’ pain.127 
Private rights of action can give those neighbors a more direct way to shift 
their costs to liable owners.128 Tort approaches have their own costs.129 Rarely 
can those costs be easily shared when many neighbors are affected.130 In the 
end, the ultimate effectiveness of the private remedy will depend on the 
feasibility of collecting money judgments.131 
While in personam remedies also focus on money, they are not quite so 
limited as a civil suit for damages. Many jurisdictions allow fines to be 
imposed relatively quickly, sometimes through an administrative process.132 
The amount of these fines does not depend on the monetary loss suffered by 
neighbors or the public at large.133 Moreover, in many cities, these fines 
immediately become liens on the property, often taking first priority over 
preexisting private mortgages and liens.134 But traditional code enforcement 
sanctions are not limited to the pocketbook.135 
When courts are involved, injunctions can be issued and backed up 
through findings of contempt.136 While theoretically enforceable through 
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imprisonment, willful failure to comply with an order to repair generally yields 
still larger fines.137 A finding of willfulness requires the court to look into the 
costs of compliance and the ability of the owner to afford them.138 As the costs 
of rehabilitation can involve tens of thousands of dollars,139 relatively few 
owners will have sufficient cash on hand to bring the property into full code 
compliance. 
Whether administrative or judicial in nature, proceedings to enforce 
building code violations require notice to responsible parties.140 Enhanced 
enforcement mechanisms involve still greater due process requirements.141 
Criminal contempt proceedings, for example, cannot move forward unless the 
accused is present in the courtroom.142 When the subject matter is a house that 
the owner of record abandoned years ago, tracking down and personally 
serving that owner can be a major undertaking.143 Even if the owner lives in 
the area, the address provided in official records for him or her may be the 
vacant property itself.144 When the owner is an investor in another state or 
another country, the problems of hailing him or her into court increase 
significantly.145 Experienced building code violators are rarely motivated to 
make notification easier, especially once they learn the benefits of evading 
notices.146 
Proceedings that focus on ownership of property rather than adjudicate 
personal obligation are in rem, not in personam.147 These proceedings also 
require that affected parties receive constitutionally adequate notice.148 But 
rules and statutes specifying adequate notice are often less exacting for 
foreclosure and other in rem processes than for their in personam 
counterparts.149 A plaintiff in a lawsuit for damages against the owner of a 
vacant house may be able to proceed without actual, personal service only after 
demonstrating that his or her attempts to serve the defendant have been 
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unsuccessful because of the defendant’s deliberate attempts to evade service.150 
The evidence of evasion may prove to be more elusive than the defendant.151 
For in rem proceedings, however, a court will only be satisfied once all 
reasonable attempts to notify the defendant at all reasonably ascertainable 
addresses have been made.152 
In personam remedies can light a fire under those who have been slow to 
commence a feasible rehabilitation. When the neighborhood market supports 
the legally required investment, the threat of fines will frequently succeed in 
helping responsible owners appreciate their neighbors’ predicament and 
remedy the situation.153 Even when the rehabilitation investment is not assured 
to be fully reflected in the resale value of the home, the prospect of significant 
fines can make an owner put his or her doubts aside.154 To a lesser extent, a 
stubborn or contrary owner can sometimes be coerced to make an investment 
in a vacant property that will benefit him or her in the long-term even if he 
refuses to see it.155 
But, many times, a financially feasible renovation of a vacant house is so 
stymied by an owner’s lack of willingness and/or ability to rehabilitate the 
property that neither threats of sanctions nor the sanctions themselves will 
produce the needed rehabilitation.156 The coercion approach to cost 
internalization as a mode of achieving better pricing and market efficiency 
presupposes the capability and rationality of the owner.157 Even if the owner is 
able both to recognize and pursue a worthwhile rehabilitation of the property, 
he or she may not be able to benefit from the investment due to outstanding 
mortgages and liens and may refuse to send good money after bad.158 
An owner’s inability to carry out a financially feasible rehabilitation may 
stem from a total lack of executive functioning. Working with contractors is 
challenging and some owners will be overmatched by the complexity of their 
role.159 In some cases, the lack of capacity is much clearer. A mentally 
incompetent or deceased owner will not be made to comply with an order to 
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repair, no matter how sensible the investment is.160 Proper notice of threat of 
foreclosure, including special forms of notice to protect owners that lack legal 
capacity, may motivate curative action or a voluntary transfer.161 Otherwise, an 
owner incapable of meeting basic code obligations must be replaced, making 
transfer of title essential to any privately funded abatement of such a vacant 
house nuisance.162 
An owner unwilling to act prudently makes unlikely not only compliance 
by rehabilitation but also limits hope that a voluntary transfer to a rational, 
capable owner will happen. An owner who refuses not only to fix the property 
but also turns down reasonable purchase offers may have a completely 
unrealistic view of its worth.163 Alternatively, the owner may have a strong 
personal attachment to the property even though it is no longer habitable.164 In 
such cases, an involuntary transfer by means of foreclosing a super-priority 
lien presents an attractive alternative to court-ordered coercion. By forcing 
such owners to realize that ignoring their responsibilities will cost them their 
ownership of the property, a foreclosure based on failure to comply with code 
takes a new approach to cost internalization, one in which the cost imposed on 
the responsible party is liquidation of their ownership interest.165 
If the owner’s interest is underwater, then even a willing seller may not be 
able to unload the property. Anyone buying the property will want to acquire it 
only once it is free and clear of any liens and encumbrances. If the owner is in 
default, the mortgagee may have the legal right to foreclose but elect not to 
pursue foreclosure because of doubts about the property condition and the 
strength of the neighborhood real estate market.166 Without the foreclosure, the 
owner has legal title but no financial stake, while the lender has a financial 
interest but lacks legal title.167 When a bargain-and-sale transfer is unavailable, 
a title-clearing mechanism such as a super-priority lien foreclosure may be the 
only feasible response. 
An owner who is forced to choose between eliminating the nuisance or 
having his property sold to those who are willing to fix it faces the true market 
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judgment regarding the decision to invest in rehabilitation.168 If the property is 
not worth fixing up right away, there will be no foreclosure because there will 
be no buyers willing to take on the responsibility of rehabilitating the 
property.169 If, however, the property is located in a neighborhood strong 
enough to support investment in it, then the stakeholders are put to the question 
as to whether they will preserve their interests and carry out the renovation or 
step aside and take the cash value of their stakes in the property in its current 
condition.170 
Foreclosure produces better cost internalization than traditional code 
enforcement in certain cases for two reasons. First, the in rem approach to 
procedural due process is not as burdensome as for civil and criminal contempt 
proceedings and does not lead to a battle of wills with intransigent 
defendants.171 Second, the cost being shifted onto the noncompliant owner in 
foreclosure is no longer a fine of questionable collectability but the imminent 
loss of his or her ownership in the property.172 
A. When Stand-Alone Renovations Do Not Pencil Out—The Need for 
Investment Coordination 
Fragmentation of urban land into small lots intensifies the externality 
problem and the importance of vacant house remediation.173 Effective methods 
for cost internalization, for forcing owners to face the true economic decision 
before them or replace them with those who will, are essential for those 
neighborhoods that still have the strength to justify the investment required for 
complete rehabilitation of a vacant property.174 But, what if a neighborhood is 
already beset by a dozen or more vacant properties? Fixing up one alone will 
not only fail to bring adequate return for that rehabilitator, but it will also not 
make an appreciable difference in the neighborhood.175 Here, the 
fragmentation associated with city neighborhoods requires remedies to go 
beyond cost internalization to more proactive investment coordination.176 
The above discussion of vacant, derelict houses in otherwise healthy 
neighborhoods examined several cases in which sensible renovations were 
frustrated by ownership circumstances. The assumption that the prolonged 
presence of a vacant house signals the decline of the neighborhood can be a 
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self-fulfilling prophecy.177 But, cost internalization remedies that effectively 
use the threat of foreclosure can sort out which properties can be brought back 
to productive use right away.178 Even in those neighborhoods where renovation 
is not supported by the local real estate market, revitalization should not 
necessarily be judged unsustainable. Instead of bringing one property back to 
productive use, it may be necessary to bring the neighborhood as a whole 
back.179 
The coordination of real estate investment has been used to justify massive 
urban redevelopment projects using eminent domain.180 But, using tax 
foreclosure to acquire vacant properties in neighborhoods beset by them offers 
a more promising alternative. First, tax foreclosure sidesteps the troubled 
history of urban renewal’s use of eminent domain and the more recent populist 
backlash that arose from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of 
New London.181 Second, the top-down, large scale investment necessary to 
justify the use of eminent domain can give way to alternative approaches to 
neighborhood revitalization, ones that engage the community about what is 
best right now and what steps can be made toward a brighter future.182 Third, 
tax foreclosure is not burdened by the statutory limitations associated with 
eminent domain proceedings.183 
The innate power of the sovereign to compel the sale of privately owned 
land for public necessity has been unquestioned by the law but has greatly 
troubled everyday citizens, particularly homeowners.184 When the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the City of New London had a right to take owner-
occupied residential property as part of a redevelopment project that would 
induce investment from the Pfizer Corporation, a tidal wave of anti-
redevelopment sentiment spread across the nation.185 Although Hurricane 
Katrina shattered New Orleans later that same year, voters in Louisiana 
subsequently voted to curtail the use of eminent domain authority for 
redevelopment purposes.186 The reality that a property owner could be forced 
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to sell his or her land without fault or ability to prevent the sale profoundly 
disturbs many Americans’ sense of what it means to be a homeowner.187 
Although tax foreclosure can accomplish many of the same land assembly 
goals used to justify eminent domain, it offers both a rationale for liquidation 
and an opportunity to avoid it. The payment of property taxes is a fundamental 
and universally applicable obligation of property ownership.188 Because a 
person who does not pay property taxes does not expect to be able to escape 
the consequences of delinquency, the prospect of tax foreclosure does not 
threaten the security of tenure of property owners generally.189 The foreclosure 
process itself is designed to allow a reasonable period of time for the debtor to 
cure the default and preserve his or her ownership of the property.190 By 
reconnecting the equity of redemption to land assembly and title clearing, tax 
foreclosure reclaims truly derelict properties in a way that builds upon a sense 
of fair play.191 
Land banking is nothing more than the acquisition of vacant properties for 
subsequent return to productive use.192 Scaled-up tax foreclosure of delinquent 
houses and lots allows for land assembly and a bundled disposition process.193 
As with the controversial redevelopment plan challenged in Kelo, the transfer 
from the public entity to the private recipient in an eminent domain 
redevelopment is already arranged before the properties are taken, often 
without meaningful community input.194 Because the tax foreclosure 
mechanism is a creditor’s device, which does not need to require a public use 
pretext, tax-delinquent vacant properties can be assembled as communities 
engage with the publicly accountable land banking entity as to their 
disposition.195 Land banking strategies can work in tandem with demolition of 
vacant houses to create usable open space in severely undercrowded 
neighborhoods.196 Newly created vacant lots can be made available to 
homeowners as sideyards and to community greening groups as vegetable 
gardens and pocket parks. By gaining control and taking responsibility for 
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vacant properties right now, land banks can set the stage for a grounded move 
forward for communities contending with decades of demographic decline. 
Finally, tax foreclosure, in addition to being free of the historical baggage 
associated with eminent domain redevelopment, is not subject to the same 
legal constraints that follow the delegation of eminent domain to local 
governments. As an inherent power of the sovereign, the power of eminent 
domain condemnation is vested originally in state legislatures.197 Those state 
legislatures have the power to delegate that authority to other bodies but often 
subject the invocation of that power to planning restrictions and further 
legislative action at the local level.198 The actual condemnation award is 
adjudicated through a jury trial process, incentivizing public agencies to pay 
premiums to streamline acquisition.199 For the kind of land assembly needed 
by severely distressed communities, a tax foreclosure approach is less costly 
and more efficient.200 
III.  FILLING IN THE GAPS 
In this final part, I move beyond the case for foreclosure-based responses 
to vacant houses and look at the actual tools being used to reconnect derelict 
structures to a sustainable urban market. The vacant property problem has been 
a top agenda item for many struggling cities well before the mortgage 
foreclosure crisis made it a national emergency.201 The need for powerful tools 
to repair faltering neighborhood real estate markets has already spurred 
innovations along the lines advocated for above. An examination of the 
essential features of these best practices provides guideposts for broader-based 
reform. 
In 1990, Baltimore enacted an amendment to its Building Code, an 
adoption of the precursor to the IBC.202 The ordinance empowered the city, or 
its community nonprofit designee, to file a judicial petition for appointment of 
a receiver for any property that has an outstanding vacant building violation 
notice.203 In order to avoid the appointment of the receiver, an owner, a 
mortgagee, or any other party with a preexisting interest in that property has to 
show a willingness and ability to rehabilitate the property.204 Once appointed, 
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the receiver's expenses, administrative as well as remedial, form the basis for a 
super-priority lien on the vacant property.205 
Many other code enforcement receivership statutes require long waiting 
periods prior to a receiver's foreclosure on his or her special lien.206 Designed 
for income-producing, occupied apartment buildings, these receivership 
procedures provide for foreclosure only as a last-resort means of recouping the 
costs of maintaining a truly abandoned building.207 Baltimore's ordinance, 
however, authorizes the court to have the receiver foreclose on this lien before 
rehabilitation work has even begun and auction the property off to any bidder 
who has demonstrated the ability to rehabilitate the property immediately.208 
Rather than require the receiver to try to obtain financing on a property that he 
or she does not own, vacant building receivership offers nuisance abatement 
using private capital.209 
At its core, this remedy imposes a super-priority lien for failure to 
eliminate a vacant building nuisance. The fact that the receiver’s lien takes 
priority over all preexisting private mortgages and liens allows the threat of 
foreclosure to be effective against lenders as well as owners. If these parties do 
not step forward to fix the property, then the receiver is able to offer a clean 
title to those who will.210 
Creating new super-priority liens and foreclosure proceedings would be 
beyond the scope of most local governments’ home rule authority.211 Baltimore 
was able to create such a proceeding because of a relatively unique provision 
in Maryland’s home rule provisions that allows the city “[t]o enact local laws 
... for the protection and promotion of public safety, health, morals, comfort 
and welfare, relating to ... the erection, construction, repair and use of 
buildings and other structures; and to enact local laws providing appropriate 
administrative and judicial proceedings, remedies, and sanctions for the 
administration and enforcement of such ordinances and amendments.”212 On 
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the other hand, jurisdictions, such as Cleveland, Ohio, have been forced to go 
to their state legislatures to enact such a remedy.213 The resulting receivership 
law in Ohio creates a lien that takes priority over preexisting judgment liens 
but not mortgages.214 
Nearly as important as the super-priority nature of the lien is the timing of 
the actual foreclosure sale. In order to make the threatened liquidation of the 
property a true inducement to the delinquent owner to fix or transfer the 
property, the foreclosure on the receiver’s lien cannot be a mere eventuality a 
year or two down the road.215 Even if the foreclosure of the lien can be 
postponed by the owner’s payment in full of the receiver’s costs, the owner 
must be made to understand that he or she will pay for bringing property into 
code compliance or the property will be sold.216 
Baltimore’s approach is somewhat unique in that it authorizes the court to 
order the sale of the property before the code violations have been corrected.217 
The transfer itself to a qualified bidder is part of the remedial strategy.218 By 
allowing a pre-screened buyer to purchase the property in its dilapidated state, 
this approach allows the party that is going to ready the property for productive 
use to handle the entire rehabilitation process.219 Other receivership statutes 
require the receiver to eliminate the outstanding code violations as a 
prerequisite to any foreclosure on the unpaid lien.220 Indiana’s unsafe building 
law is not clear on this point.221 A promising middle ground would be to 
require that the receiver carry out any urgently needed repairs on the vacant 
structure before putting it up for sale. 
If the property is to be sold in anything less than pristine condition, it is of 
great importance that bidders at the auction be pre-qualified as developers 
willing and able to rehabilitate the property. Transferring the property from 
one delinquent owner to another does nothing to remedy a vacant house 
nuisance. Many cities have broad authority to conduct urgently needed repairs 
to the exteriors of vacant houses and impose super-priority liens without 
judicial appointment of a receiver.222 When foreclosed these liens enter into the 
general tax sale process in which an array of speculators and debt collectors 
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bid alongside experienced developers.223 For a receivership sale remedy to be 
an effective and legitimate means of achieving code compliance, bidders at any 
such sale must be screened and must be held accountable on their commitment 
to prompt rehabilitation of the property.224 
The process of screening bidders for a receivership sale also helps ensure 
that the properties are amenable to renovation using private capital.225 If a 
vacant house is located in a market that is too weak to support the investment 
needed to bring the property into compliance, a foreclosure based on failure to 
adhere to code standards is not an appropriate response.226 Neighborhoods with 
multiple vacant properties require the kind of investment coordination that 
property tax foreclosure provides. The weakness of the real estate markets in 
these neighborhoods facilitates tax foreclosure by discouraging owners from 
paying property taxes on the vacant houses and lots they own.227 
Every state provides some statutory scheme for collecting unpaid property 
taxes by foreclosure.228 The vast majority of states use a combined sale and 
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foreclosure process to ensure both that the taxes due are paid in full and that 
any leftover value in the property is made available to the stakeholders whose 
interests have been liquidated.229 Most mortgage foreclosure proceedings 
auction the property only after the borrower’s time to redeem has elapsed.230 In 
property tax collections, however, most proceedings to foreclose the equity of 
redemption occurs only after the property tax lien has been sold to a private 
bidder.231 
Some states grant tailored periods of redemption for different types of 
property interests.232 Although Kansas is patient with homestead owners, 
giving them three years to pay, owners of vacant buildings receive only one 
year after the sale to prevent foreclosure.233 Kansas has decided that the 
community should not have to be particularly patient with owners of 
unoccupied properties when “there has been a failure to perform reasonable 
maintenance.”234 
Crucial to the success of tax sale foreclosure as both a collection remedy 
and a means of clearing title to abandoned properties is the super-priority 
nature of the property tax lien, which allows it to take precedence over not only 
ownership interest but also mortgage and judgment lien interests that predate 
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the tax delinquency.235 Because claims for unpaid property taxes take priority 
over pre-existing private liens, all parties with substantial interests in the 
property are entitled to notice of their opportunity to redeem.236 Constructive 
notice, such as publication of an advertisement in a newspaper of general 
circulation, can constitute constitutionally adequate notice, but only after 
diligent attempts at direct notification have been made.237 
Effective reform of tax foreclosure laws impacting vacant properties 
requires attention to the procedures for the sale of liens as well as to the time 
for redemption afforded the owners and other stakeholders. A sensible 
approach to the sale of tax liens on vacant and abandoned houses and the lots 
resulting from their demolition allows local jurisdictions to facilitate 
investment coordination without fear of severely underpricing important 
receivables. A similarly tailored approach to the waiting period between the 
sale of a tax certificate on a vacant and abandoned property and the issuance of 
a deed for that property recognizes the urgency of getting such a property back 
into productive use without undercutting the rights of other owners, especially 
homeowners, to raise the money needed to prevent loss of their land to 
foreclosure. 
Unoccupied, derelict properties located in neighborhoods with insufficient 
market strength to support their rehabilitation require special tax sale 
procedures to facilitate their return to productive use. A great many of these 
properties could not be sold, after a complete renovation, on the open market 
for just the costs of the needed repairs. That is, even if one such vacant house 
could be transferred in its dilapidated condition to a new, capable owner for $1, 
the needed renovations would still not be economically feasible. As discussed 
above, allowing a developer or team of developers to invest in all the vacant 
houses in a neighborhood offers a way to reset the market paradigm that 
constrains the influx of desperately needed capital.238 The prevalence of 
significant tax delinquency makes tax foreclosure an ideal way to allow 
coordinated title-clearing efforts. Unfortunately, the great size of tax 
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arrearages, when combined with legislated tax sale rules that require a 
minimum bid no less than the amount of the tax delinquency, prevents these 
properties from even taking the first step toward reconnection with the 
market.239 
While minimum bid provisions may make sense for tax sales generally, 
they significantly harm efforts to return tax-delinquent vacant properties to 
productive use. Many, if not all, states require that any bid at a conventional 
tax lien auction to purchase a tax-delinquent property be sufficient to pay the 
relevant state and local government taxes and related charges due on the 
property.240 Generally, the potential for corruption and abuse in a mass auction 
of public receivables justifies the legislature’s insistence on receiving the full 
value of what the public is owed. Vacant and abandoned properties with large 
tax arrearages invariably remain unsold at the end of tax sales with such 
minimum bid requirements.241 
Land banking efforts, however, are demonstrating that vacant and 
abandoned properties can be transferred to developers capable of returning 
them to productive use as long as an auction mechanism is not relied upon 
either to identify those buyers or to set the price of the sale. To accomplish the 
appropriate bundling and pricing of vacant properties in need on investment 
coordination, land banks must be empowered to purchase and foreclose on 
vacant property tax certificates without being required to pay the full lien 
value. As publicly accountable entities, they need to be able to work with 
potential developers to identify coordinated investment opportunities and sell 
the properties at prices that reflect the market realities and the public benefit of 
having the properties returned to productive use. Auctions do not allow for the 
verification of capacity and financing required for large-scale redevelopment 
projects nor do they allow for the negotiations needed to produce thoughtful 
pricing of the real property assets. To facilitate an ultimately more efficient 
mode of vacant property disposition, minimum bid requirements must be 
abandoned to allow transfers of qualifying tax certificates to land banks. States, 
such as Kansas, have recognized the need to set post-tax-sale redemption 
periods at different lengths to protect different kinds of property ownership.242 
Those states facing significant concentrations of vacant properties in their 
urban neighborhoods must shorten the minimum time for completion of the 
foreclosure. For instance, Maryland requires most tax-sale purchasers to wait 
six months before commencing judicial foreclosure proceedings, but properties 
that have been certified as in need of substantial repair can be foreclosed upon 
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after 60 days.243 The waiting period is eliminated altogether for tax sale 
certificates sold at special bulk sales designed to facilitate land banking 
efforts.244 Likewise, Indiana requires a delinquent owner to redeem a property 
within one year of a conventional tax sale;245 but, it shortens that redemption 
period to 120 days for properties sold at a special sale without the standard 
minimum bid requirement.246 These clear and reasonable differences in 
redemption periods follow from the fact that foreclosure of vacant properties, 
by definition, do not result in the displacement of legal occupants. Moreover, 
the community need for investment in these properties requires a quicker 
transition than that allowed to tax-foreclosed properties generally. 
The major gap between conventional code enforcement and eminent 
domain is filled by the remedies of vacant building receivership and tax sale 
foreclosure. Both use an owner’s failure to meet basic public obligations as a 
basis for liquidating all the title interests in the derelict property should the 
stakeholders not step forward and bring the property into compliance. The 
receivership remedy, which combines code enforcement and title-clearing 
mechanisms, is only now being enacted in various jurisdictions.247 The tax 
foreclosure proceeding, while widely available, requires major reform in many 
jurisdictions if it is to be effective in accomplishing the investment 
coordination goals for which it is uniquely suited.248 Together, these remedies 
can complete a nearly seamless array of vacant property responses that can 
allow local communities to reconnect any vacant property to a real estate 
market that can return it to vitality. 
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